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Neither Slave nor Free: Th 5 per cent of libertos in that city.6 The distinction between ingenuo and liberto, of course, was not physically obvious; it was a thin legal distinction, not a genetic one, and the fundamental fact of descent overshadowed it. The same was true of the more meaningful legal distinction between free black and slave. There could be no reliable phenotypic differentiation between any of these categories, and the sea of black faces that so impressed foreign visitors to Brazil included ingenuos, libertos, and slaves in bewildering mixture. An American traveler, Thomas Ewbank, remarked on the range of tasks performed by Negroes of every shade and condition, but his impression was predominantly one of race, and the mixture of legal status within that category confused him. Finally, he concluded weakly that one could tell slaves from free blacks because the latter wore shoes.7
The fact that Brazilian blacks and mixed bloods did not wear their legal status on their sleeves (or their feet) confused some Portuguese and Brazilians, too. During the colonial period it was common for royal legislation to be so vaguely worded as to affect coloreds on both sides of the legal line between free and slave. And there are examples of openly discriminatory legislation aimed at restricting the civil rights of the free colored population. A. J. R. Russell-Wood has described the free black or mulatto in Brazil during the colonial period as a legal anomaly toward which there existed no clear Crown policy. Rather than guaranteeing to members of this group the legal protections of regular free society, or even elaborating a special code for them as legal intermediaries, the Crown (and local white elites) chose to legislate largely on grounds of ethnicity, as often as not grouping free coloreds with slaves.8
After political independence, Brazilian legislation continued to reflect this perhaps calculated confusion about the legal status of free blacks. The first years of independence were crucial in this regard, because the break with Portugal and the old system demanded that new legislation swiftly define that which would change and that which would be preserved under the new regime. Not surprisingly, Brazilian statesmen wasted no time in reaffirming the sanctity of the master-slave relationship. Of the twentythree laws passed regarding slave treatment and punishment during the entire course of the empire (1822-89), for instance, eighteen were passed during the early years between 1822 and i837.9 Less care was taken to define the status of the free coloreds who continued to be affected by imprecise measures aimed ostensibly at slaves.
The conflicts that arose in such cases inevitably led to problems of official terminology over the first years of independence. In a typical early case of 1824 the Minister of Justice ordered that Negro rowdies (capoeiras) responsible for disorderly behavior in the city of Rio de Janeiro should be severely punished; but halfway through the order, the minister, apparently unconsciously, changed his terminology from the vague 'negro capoeira' to the specific ' escravo' (slave). Several months later the minister was forced to issue a clarification of his order in which he admitted the confusion between 'Negroes' and 'slaves'. The previous order, he said, had 'encompassed different classes of individuals, even free and white men'. According to the revised regulations, all free men would have to be tried and sentenced by regular courts before being punished for the offenses described.10 One year later the Minister of Justice tried to skirt the complicated issue of civil status by falling back on a terminology that was blatantly discriminatory on ethnic grounds. Again the issue was law and order in the city of Rio, and the Ministry's edict established one curfew for whites and another for 'Negroes and colored men' who could not loiter on street corners, plazas, or whistle at passers by at any time after nightfall.1"
By and large, however, in the late I82os and early I83os imperial statesmen discarded both the legalism of civil status and the overt discrimination of racial criteria in favor of language based on behavioral and social categories. The race question, apparently so simple, yet now so difficult to deal with because of legal hazards and constitutional restrictions, was increasingly subordinated to the imprecise but value-laden language of a 'social problem'. Official measures designed to assure social control, such as those mentioned above, no longer specified their targets as Negroes, slaves, or even capoeiras. Instead, all these groups were found to fit neatly into the capacious category of vadios e ociosos (vagrants and idlers), or desordeiros 9 Josephine Chaia and Luis Lisante, ' 0 escravo na legislacao brasileira (I808-1889),' Revista de Historia (July-Sept. I974), pp. 24I-8. 10 Brazil, Colefao das decisoes do governo do imperio brasileiro, I824 (Portarias of Minister of Justice), pp. 87, I39. 11 Ibid., I825, pp. I-3. For other examples of official discrimination, see the legislation, inspired by slave rebelliousness in Bahia, which required free blacks to carry passports whenever they travelled in the province, and that which allowed the provincial president to deport any suspicious libertos without judicial process, or even in spite of acquittal by the regular courts. Brazil, Colefao das leis do imperio brasileiro, I829, part nI, Decree of 20 Mar. I829; Brazil, Colefao das decisoes, 1835, p. I.
(disorderly elements).2 At the same time, those individuals arbitrarily grouped in these categories were effectively stripped of their guarantees of due process because the penalty for vagrancy and the rest was normally conscription into the armed forces, for which no regular court procedure was considered necessary.'l The Brazilian Constitution of 1824 likewise hedged its language where the rights of free men of color were concerned. While it extended citizenship to all free men born in Brazil, and specifically included in that number ingenuos and libertos, it maintained throughout the fine distinction between these categories, implying that blacks born free occupied a higher civil status; than those released from captivity at some time after birth. In only one article of the Constitution was this discrimination made explicit: libertos were not allowed to vote in secondary elections. This single restriction masked broader consequences, for qualification as a second degree elector was a necessary prerequisite for service in most high posts of the empire, including those of provincial and national deputy.14 The number of libertos was relatively small, however, and, since the group was almost by definition inarticulate, there is no record of protest over this provision in the Constitution. (Table II) , and many other newspapers responded to the issues they raised. In keeping with the temper of the no-holds-barred journalism of the day, the mulatto-oriented publications described The government party's newspaper, Aurora Fluminense, and its editor, Evaristo da Veiga, fielded these charges almost singlehandedly. From the first, Evaristo showed an understandable confusion about the nature of the attacks. For one thing, in I831 they had seemed to be connected primarily with the political left, but by 1833 the most alarming racial rhetoric was being generated by the reactionaries on the right. And there was, of course, a more basic question to be asked of the origin of the mulatto press attacks: were they merely a tactic being used by conventional political foes, or did they represent the genuine political opposition of a selfbconscious racial group? Evaristo da Veiga decided that they were the former, and defended his party in the same political terms that the 'mulatto press' used to attack it. In his ,running defense, Evaristo carefully distinguished between the real interests of free blacks and the political interests of the extremists who were trying to 'delude' those blacks by playing on ungrounded fears and old resentments in the same way that the emperor had done in 1831. The editor denied that the government discriminated in its appointment and hiring practices, and noted that the Moderado party had black members who were as well respected as the whites.26 This is not to suggest that Evaristo da Veiga and his followers believed that the mulatto press was trivial because it was a managed tactic rather than a groundswell. Certainly they worried a great deal about the damage that such irresponsible stirring of racial tensions could do, and as the years passed their worry deepened. What was described rather mildly as the 'intrigue of colors' in 1832 had been labeled the much more portentous 'Haitianism' by I835.27
There is a good deal of evidence that Evaristo was right -that the mulatto press of the early I830s was less a vehicle of mulatto self-expression than of racist provocation by whites (or mulattoes) with conventional political goals. (Table II) , for instance, was not due to any specific pressure on the mulatto community at the time, but rather coincided with government pressure upon the Caramuru group which responded in its desperation by agitating the race issue. The restorationist line dominated the mulatto press of 1833, yet it is difficult to imagine why any mulatto would choose to ally with the Caramuru faction, identified as it was with the racist Portuguese and a foreign emperor never known for his generosity toward colored Brazilians. For their part, the Caramurus seem to have been more than willing to work both sides of the street. At least one anonymous Caramuru pamphlet of 1831 adopted an openly racist position, calling for white Brazilians to be tolerant of the remaining Portuguese because if they were expelled, the Negroes would then outnumber and overpower the remaining whites. The pamphlet went on to strike every chord of race fear and prejudice in its considerable repertoire.28 The following year in Minas Gerais one newspaper reported the about-face of opportunistic (and certainly white) members of the restorationist faction who had previously demanded the exclusion of mulattoes from public office, but now were agitating those same citizens with promises of government jobs and patronage.29 There is even some indication that the Exaltado paper, 0 Homem de Cor, was for a time secretly edited by a well-known Caramuru leader.30 In view of all this it is worth speculating whether the Caramurus' adoption of the race issue may not have been purely provocative. Perhaps the restorationists imagined that their conservative political goals -driving white Brazilians back into the emperorss fold -would be best served by keeping before the public the spectre of race conflict, regardless of the political context in which it was presented. If this is so, then we must be prepared to re-evaluate the mulatto press in a completely different light. Instead of representing mulattoes writing directly for other mulattoes, some, if not all, of these papers may have been addressed indirectly to whites. Rather than promoting the welfare of mixed-bloods, they may have had the very different goal of panicking whites, a goal which, if achieved, would very likely have a detrimental long-term effect on the interests of the colored population.
The Exaltado arm of the mulatto press phenomenon may have been more sincere; in general, the left-wing press was both more consistent and more tenacious in its position on racial discrimination. Yet however straightforward their own feelings about race, the leftists and the non-restorationist Is it possible, then, to give any definite example of a mulatto championing the rights of his racial group? During the period under discussion, it is striking that only one individual to whom we can attach both a name and a mixed racial identity, the mulatto Antonio Pereira Reboucas, raised his voice in support of colored citizens. Reboucas was several times a federal deputy from the province of Bahia in the i83os and i84os, and was perhaps the most visible ,mulatto in the political world. Unlike the editors previously mentioned, however, this example of the efficacy of the mulatto escape hatch did not shun the race issue altogether. Although he too had to endure vicious racial attacks by his colleagues in the Chamber of Deputies and his enemies in the press,37 he apparently took some pride in his background and openly referred to it in his occasional efforts to promote or protect the interests of colored Brazilians. 34 
But Reboupas's was a wary and self-serving advocacy. Like Evaristo da
Veiga and others, he viewed the manipulation of racial tensions as a politically motivated and potentially dangerous tactic, one which was basically extrinsic to the question of rights for colored citizens. Reboucas himself was prone to use the race question for narrow partisan ends. An example of his equivocal attitude is expressed in a speech of I843 in which he mentioned the small numbers of mulattoes in government and then attempted a correlation of the incidence of racial agitation with the broader political context. He suggested to his colleagues in the Chamber of Deputies that during all times of general peace in the empire ' a few turbulent and innovative spirits have given themselves to the intrigue of colors'. After the disorders of 1824 in Recife, he claimed, such intrigues had been 'in vogue'. Then again, after the conclusion of the war with Buenos Aires (1828), 'the same intrigue reappeared' with its 'false and defamatory imputations'. He discovered other outbreaks in 1831 and 1835, and he predicted that when the war in Rio Grande do Sul ended they would surface again.38 From a factual point of view this fascinating chronology has little to recommend it; it omits, for instance, the mulatto agitation of I833. But in context it is most revealing of the qualified sense of racial solidarity that a prominent mulatto like Ant6nio Pereira Reboucas could feel. As the rambling speech developed, it became clear that far from threatening racial upheaval, Reboucas had merely digressed into the problems of racial exclusion and agitation as a metaphor for the exclusion of, and potential agitation by, members of his party (Liberal) during a time of dominance by the Conservatives. Reboucas was here advocating minority party representation in the 'ministry in the same breath with his denunciation of the exclusion of a racial minority, and it was difficult to tell which was to him the more important. For this mulatto, then, the tension over race was not only a managed, somewhat artificial intrigue whose incidence could be predicted by external factors, but it was also intimately connected with conventional party politics, and, more especially, with his own political career. Reboucas ended his speech in a lighthearted exchange with a colleague over 'why the mulatto deputy had not himself been called to form a ministry.39
Having said this, it is perhaps unnecessary to explore any deeper into the feelings of these prominent mulattoes toward the even less fortunate of their race. But it is at least worthwhile to point out that none of these men felt any evident repugnance for black slavery. When Justiniano Jose da Rocha edited pro-government newspapers, for instance, he sometimes collected part of his pay in the form of illegally imported Africans seized by reported to a friend that in various electoral districts of Minas Gerais anonymous letters circulated accusing him of being the leader of a 'club of Haitianism'. In at least one district (where, scoffed the candidate, the residents 'believe in Haitianism') the scare tactic worked, but the desperate revival of the race issue did not prevent Rocha's election province-wide.44 These were isolated incidents, however, and after this period the tactic of overt racial intrigue was abandoned because the essential precondition had been shattered. After I835 Brazilian whites were no longer willing to tolerate debates over race. The rapid rise and fall of the intrigue of colors had an important effect on the political atmosphere of Brazil. In dramatic contrast to the early I830s, the latter half of that decade developed in Brazil as a period of conservative retrenchment and reassertion of centralized authority. The social and political pessimism of these years culminated after I837 in the movement informally known as the Regresso, or retreat from the ideals of the preceding liberal years. A number of factors combined to cause the reactionamong them regional unrest, the failure of certain liberal institutions, and simple political ambition. It is impossible to specify a single prime factor, but the mulatto press and Haitianism of the early I830s must be pinpointed as contributory elements on at least two levels.
At the most obvious level, the genuine fear of slave revolt or racial upheaval cannot be minimized. To many observers this terrifying prospect story (usually in its extreme form: an ex-slave commanding his ex-master) so often without specifics or documentation that it is probably not even apocryphal, but merely hypothetical. Berrance de Castro herself admits that her sources are mainly the press, 'especially the humoristic '.57 The point is precisely that this was alarmist rhetoric with little basis in reality, which is not to deny its importance in bringing about reform. The constant and increasingly sinister presence of the race issue from 1831 to 1835 had made race fear an incomparably powerful instrument for those who desired a more authoritarian empire, but the rhetoric of race did not always state completely the situation of fact that reform was to remedy. Thus, while race fear might provoke reform, the reforms themselves were not necessarily racist in intent. In the case of the National Guard, for instance, the real question at issue was not race but authority; not black officers but elected officers per se. Brazilian elites had the informal resources to deal with race, and they could rig elections, but in an unequal society they could not make those elections confer the kind of prestige and authority that appointment by superiors (i.e. the Crown) had traditionally done. Nor could they tolerate the divisions between white elites that such elections occasioned. These were structural problems that concerned the white elite almost exclusively; what race fear offered these elites was the atmosphere of reaction into which anti-democratic reforms could be inserted. The most important outcome of the National Guard reforms, therefore, was not some form of racial segregation but the destruction of the elective principle, a change which fundamentally circumscribed the rights of all humble Brazilians regardless of their color. In many other areas as well, the Regresso period brought the victory of the appointive principle over the elective. And for the rest of the empire, this early discredit of the electoral process must have contributed to the widespread acceptance of electoral fraud as the norm.58
As a final example, the oppressive expansion of the imperial police in the I84os certainly owed a great deal to the tension over race. A case could easily be made that the chosen means of recentralization might have taken a less coercive form, had not the slave revolt of I835 and its racial implications given the government a compelling rationale for a massive police build-up. 
Conclusion
It is perhaps not surprising that a slave society should have developed a harsh and restrictive approach to the problem of social discipline; the intriguing features in the case of Brazil are the timing and means of that development, and its relation to the subject of race. Clearly, a single-minded fear of the race issue cannot be taken as a 'given' factor, for newly independent Brazil hesitated in its approach to race, politics, and society for a dozen years after the rupture with Portugal. During that time Brazilian free society exhibited a curiously relaxed attitude toward race, and there is every evidence that some Brazilian whites felt cavalier enough to cultivate the issue as a political strategy. All this suggests a profound ambivalence over the subject of race in the newly independent empire. Race was apparently understood at this time on two ilevels: certainly it had its panic value (no one was ambivalent about slave revolt), but that reaction was neither absolute nor perfectly race-linked, for free mulattoes themselves feared slave rebellion, lacked solidarity, and were regularly co-opted into the white world. On the other hand, free coloreds ,were by no means perfectly integrated into white society, and did bear the indelible stigma of descent. Some contemporaries had a nice appreciation of society's combination of reactive fear and realistic skepticism about the racial threat; and they were cagey enough to know they could manipulate this ambivalence with impunity for short-term goals. Such partisan manipulation is at least part of the explanation of the mulatto press. Similarly, a close examination of other 'intrigue of colors' incidents of the early I83os also reveals the use of these unconventional incidents within conventional (and largely white) political contexts. Both in their causes and effects, the phenomena of the mulatto press and Haitianism were always closely bound up with non-race-related problems of political and social control, a fact which suggests that these events are better interpreted within a broad framework of socio-political formation than in the more narrow sense of race relations. One has the impression, finally, that these complex episodes amounted to something like psychodrama -Brazilian political society testing its limits; working out its ambivalence toward free blacks, mulattoes, and, in symbolic terms, class.
Why was this drama acted out in the i83os? Brazil had lived with slaves, free blacks, and mulattoes for centuries. In important ways, however, the modus vivendi of centuries broke down after independence in 1822. Most educated Brazilians took seriously the new ideas of political liberalism and constitutional government; and many who did not were soon forced to do so by the provocations -some of them racial -of the first emperor and his supporters. The difficult question of legal status for the large free colored population arose immediately, and the struggle with that question coincided with a period of unprecedented decentralization and democratization of Brazilian life. But race was still too sensitive to be batted around long without turning ugly, and the increasingly malignant political abuses of the race issue also paralleled (and reinforced) the apparent failure of the democratizing reforms. Equally important, the very airing of the race question fundamentally denied some of the underlying social assumptions upon which the liberals had based their reforms. With the intellectual groundwork thus eroded, the slave revolt of 1835 ensured reaction against much more than the few slaves involved.
By 1841 abiding reactionary changes in social attitudes and the structures of authority had taken place in Brazil, and the negative outcome of the race question was one reason for the changes. Genuine race fear, by definition, could not often be mentioned aloud, while constitutional restrictions and ideology prevented racially exclusive legislation. So in informal attitudes as well as in formal regulation, the race problem shaded into a social problem after 1835, and the full range of reaction was therefore directed at social categories described by behavior and class rather than by skin color. Ultimately, in fact, the liberal constitutional regime in Brazil may have had the paradoxical effect of bringing comparatively greater restriction to the freedoms of most Brazilians, because the perceived threat of race could not be singled out for discriminatory treatment. Rather, legislation and attitudes that would have the same effect had to aim at vaguer behavioral categories, thus opening wide the door to arbitrary action against civil freedoms in general. For Brazilian elites, of course, this development was in all ways preferable to a crude system of racial discrimination because it also offered discretionary means of dealing with social situations unrelated to race.
There is truth in IRoger 'Bastide's statement that the Brazilian empire evolved a 'highly refined etiquette... a way of knowing how to mark out distances according to color of skin, kind of work, social situation or education'.60 But this is only another way of saying that determination of class and status was basically arbitrary and paternalistic -not girded by law and guarantees -during the empire. The events of the i83os went far toward imposing this kind of resolution by vagueness upon the troubled question of free blacks. And the resulting confusion of race and class has contributed mightily to the racial conundrum that so fascinates modern students of race and black history. But as contemporaries realized, it was impossible to understand the evolving status of blacks and mulattoes apart from that of whites. Although the system's blurred distinctions did provide a way for a few mulattoes to rise -a mulatto escape hatch -too many historians have failed to note that the same set of conditions also placed a trapdoor under Brazilians of all colors.
